at the main crossing of the Mississippi River in St. Louis to discriminate against rivals. In a ruling with continuing significance for network industries, the Court forced the defendants to give outsiders access on reasonable terms, observing that the Interstate Commerce Commission could solve the problem of setting fair access prices. 13 Standard Oil ultimately became known as one of the government's finest hours, but Congress did not view it that way in 1911. Congress feared that the Supreme Court's apparent softening of the law, by reading the Sherman Act's ban on "every" trade restraint to bar only "unreasonable" restraints, foreshadowed continuing efforts by conservative judges to narrow the statute unduly. This concern inspired enactment in 1914 of the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Clayton Act reduced judicial discretion by specifically prohibiting certain tying arrangements, exclusive dealing agreements, interlocking directorates, and mergers achieved by purchasing stock. The FTC Act ended the executive branch's public enforcement monopoly by forming an administrative body to make antitrust policy.
Ascent of the Rule of Reason: 1915-1936
Following the Standard Oil and Terminal Railroad decisions, the passage of the Clayton Act, and the creation of the FTC, it might seem that antitrust enforcement was about to step into high gear.
Instead the antitrust system entered a period of relative repose.
14 From 1915 until the mid-1930s, the courts relied heavily on reasonableness tests to evaluate business conduct and often treated suspect behavior permissively. In the same era, the executive branch discouraged aggressive prosecution by the Justice Department and the FTC.
The shift in emphasis had several sources. The first was ascent of the "associationalist" vision of business-government relations. Experience with the War Industries Board in World War I led many economists, business leaders, and government officials to believe that the business-government collaboration that guided the wartime mobilization provided the best way to organize the economy in times of peace. The associationalists received strong support from Herbert Hoover who, as
Secretary of Commerce and as President, urged businesses to cooperate through trade associations to exchange information and curb the wasteful features of competition. 15 To many observers, the economic collapse in 1929 repudiated the competitive model of economic organization and verified the associationalist preference that the government take stronger steps to orchestrate commerce. Advocates of close coordination between government and industry exercised considerable influence in designing the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and other planning experiments of the early New Deal. 16 By mid-decade, Congress imposed comprehensive controls on entry and pricing in sectors such as transportation and passed the Robinson-Patman Act (1936) , which sought to prevent national retailing chains from expanding at the expense of small stores. As support for competition waned, antitrust policy receded as well. It is difficult during this period to detect significant direct effects of economic thinking and research on judicial antitrust decisions. The courts emphasized market share as an indicator of market power, while economists focused more upon the beauty of scale economies and their implications for prices and market structure. While Pigou's writings on price discrimination have proven durable, they provided no basis for the prohibitions on price discrimination in the Robinson-Patman Act. Nor does the notion of efficient price discrimination by a monopolist to recover fixed costs (that is, Ramsey pricing) appear in the cases of this era. Economists of this time were also grappling with the general problem of how to develop a theory of increasing returns together with monopolistic competition (Chamberlin, 1933 [containing work dating as early as 1921]; Robinson, 1933) . Only much later, in cases involving mergers of firms with branded products, does this thinking about product differentiation enter the legal mainstream.
Emphasis on Market Structure and Per Se Rules: 1936-1972
By the mid-1930s, the economic planning models that inspired great hope early in the New Deal had lost their luster. Franklin Roosevelt turned his ear toward advisors who believed the key to economic restoration was competition. 28 From 1936 through 1940, Roosevelt's top appointees to the Justice Department, culminating with Thurman Arnold's selection to head the Antitrust Division, mounted ambitious attacks on horizontal collusion and single-firm dominance.
The trustbusting revival drew intellectual strength from the work of University of Chicago economists Henry Simons, Jacob Viner, and Frank Knight. 29 Simons in particular assailed the statist assumptions of New Deal planning experiments such as the NIRA and advocated robust antitrust enforcement, including steps to deconcentrate American industry. 30 Here we see champions of free markets promoting antitrust and competition as preferable to government regulation, planning, or ownership. Court emphasized that horizontal price fixing agreements would be condemned summarily and treated as crimes, regardless of their actual effects. The Court warned that business managers who tried privately to recreate the planning schemes that government officials previously had approved acted at their peril. In hindsight, Socony's ban upon all arrangements that affect price seems extreme, but its aim in 1940 was to reaffirm the primacy of competition and revitalize the Sherman Act. In Socony and in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States (1939) , which found an illegal horizontal conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence, the Supreme Court showed that unlawful agreements could be proven without direct evidence such as a participant's testimony and that such arrangements, if detected, could be punished severely.
The revival of enforcement against price fixing and market allocation cartels refocused attention on antitrust's definition of "agreement." After toying with the possibility of treating oligopolistic interdependence as a form of agreement, the Supreme Court in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp. (1954) 33 ruled that proof of "conscious parallelism," without more, could not sustain a finding that the defendants acted jointly, and thus could not establish an antitrust violation. In the years to follow, litigants and courts would spend vast resources to identify the "plus factors" which, when added to proof of conscious parallelism, would permit a jury to infer an illegal agreement.
The use of per se tests to condemn conduct extended well beyond the price-setting behavior at issue
in Socony and Interstate Circuit. In this era, the Supreme Court used per se rules to ban tying arrangements that conditioned the sale of one product upon the buyer's agreement to purchase a second product; 34 non-price vertical restraints by which a manufacturer limited its retailers to specific geographic areas; 35 group boycotts by which a full-service retailer threatened not to deal with manufacturers who sold to discounters; 36 and horizontal agreements to allocate markets or customers. 37 The Court also characterized the adoption of exclusive sales territories by participants in a marketing joint venture as per se unlawful.
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As the courts tightened rules for collusion and cooperation between firms, they also grew more willing to find that dominant firms had acted improperly. (Kovacic 1992) . Even as courts strove to deal with the many tight-knit industrial oligopolies of the day, economists came to realize that departures from the perfect competition model are normal, indeed inevitable, even in "competitive" industries. This view led economists to articulate vague criteria for whether a market was "workably" competitive (Clark, 1940; Markham, 1950) . As judges grappled with how to treat parallel conduct in tight oligopolies without explicit evidence of collusion, economists were exploring the pricing behavior of oligopolists, including "price leadership," where a single large firm initiates price changes and others typically follow (Stigler, 1947; Fellner, 1949; Markham, 1951) . This work showed how price leadership could explain pricing patterns observed in tight-knit oligopolies, but it gave judges no simple formula for setting clear rules to distinguish illegal agreements from mere conscious parallelism that could yield similar outcomes. 49 As courts in this era were emphasizing measures of market structure and concentration, industrial organization thinking focused on articulating and developing the "structure, conduct, performance" paradigm often associated with the work of Joe Bain (1956; see also Mason, 1939) . This framework encouraged empirical researchers to seek relationships between market concentration and performance measures such as price/cost margins. 50 Despite an emphasis on market concentration in making this assessment, economists of this time recognized that an industry's long run performance is likely to hinge more on its level of innovation than on the four-firm concentration ratio or departures of prices from marginal cost. Finally, both the courts and economists of this time tended to downplay efficiencies associated with large-scale enterprises.
The Ascent of the Chicago School: 1973-1991
By the early 1970s, the extreme activism in antitrust law, reflected in public enforcement policy and (1982) , 60 which broke up the Bell system, these cases usually failed (Kovacic, : 1106 Ruth Ginsburg, ruled that the defendant's burden of proof in a merger case depends on whether the plaintiff relies solely on market share data or provides further evidence of likely anti-competitive effects. These decisions parallel similar developments in the federal merger guidelines, which disavowed the most extreme enforcement possibilities created by Supreme Court merger decisions in the 1960s.
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During this era, it is clear that the courts, under the Chicago School's influence, were trimming back antitrust doctrine. Yet the same analytical tools that economists used to challenge interventionist antitrust doctrines of the 1950s and 1960s, by showing that certain practices often could increase efficiency and boost competitiveness, were simultaneously offering new methods for arguing that many business practices sometimes could harm competition.
One prominent example of this dynamic occurred in the area of "predatory pricing," in which a firm temporarily sells below cost to subdue rivals and then collects monopoly rents. While economists for decades had criticized many predatory pricing cases, government enforcers remained keen on these matters through the 1970s. But the courts in the 1970s paid careful attention to the economic literature, to the extent that the term "average variable cost" now commonly appears in predatory pricing decisions (American Bar Association, 1997: 253-66) . By the mid-1980s, in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986) , 69 the Supreme Court was saying that predatory pricing rarely made business sense, because the predator had little probability of sustaining a future monopoly long enough to recoup losses incurred through below-cost sales. Yet at the same time, game theorists were showing how predation could rationally occur in a world with imperfect information and signaling, if potential entrants had long memories and declined to challenge a deeppocket incumbent who had displayed a willingness to respond to entry by selling below cost.
Game-theoretic methods dominated industrial organization theory in the 1970s and 1980s. The flexibility of game theory allowed economic theorists to generate equilibrium predictions in settings involving a wide range of conduct, from R&D decisions to advertising to product positioning, as well as the classic problem of oligopolistic pricing. However, the same flexibility made general predictions hard to come by. 70 Some conduct, such as long-term contracts with key customers or preemptive capacity expansion, could deter entry and entrench dominance, but they also could generate efficiencies. The only way to tell in a given case appeared to be for the antitrust agencies and the courts to conduct a full-scale rule-of-reason inquiry.
Towards a Post-Chicago Synthesis: Since 1992
Antitrust decisions and government enforcement policy since the mid-1990s have begun to reflect the flexibility of recent analytical perspectives. 71 The most noteworthy feature of recent cases concerning collusion or cooperation between firms is the search for manageable analytical techniques that avoid the complexity of the traditional rule of reason yet supply a richer factual analysis than per se tests.
In California Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission (1999) , 72 the Supreme Court acknowledges the conceptual validity of analytical models lying between the per se and full-fledged rule of reason poles, but does not specify how to structure such inquiries. Further development of such methodologies may occur in the Justice Department's recent challenge to the membership rules of Visa and MasterCard, which prevent member financial institutions from issuing credit cards that compete against Visa and MasterCard, 73 and in proposed federal guidelines on collaboration among competitors.
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Government efforts to combat collusion in the 1990s have applied game theory in two notable ways.
First, the Justice Department adopted a policy that gives criminal immunity to the first cartel member to reveal the cartel's existence. 75 Recent criminal enforcement results indicate that the strategy elicits valuable information. In 1999, using data supplied by a cartel member under the new policy, the Justice Department obtained guilty pleas from BASF and Roche to pay a total of $750 million in criminal fines (an amount surpassing the sum of all Sherman Act criminal fines since 1890) for fixing vitamin prices. 76 Second, the government has prosecuted behavior that facilitates coordination, not just the coordination itself. For example, in the early 1990s, the government obtained a settlement from several airlines to bar the use of computer reservation systems to coordinate prices. 77 As the Internet emerges as a key conduit for commerce, we will see more enforcement actions and judicial decisions on how firms may interact in cyberspace (Baker 1996) .
Perhaps the most important modern judicial use of game theory, the economics of information, and analyzed competitive effects in seemingly narrow submarkets and have used electronic data from cash registers to measure market power directly by analyzing how the business at one chain affected the other. However, in 1997, the federal agencies amended their merger guidelines to account more generously for merger synergies in analyzing competitive effects. This approach could make the law more friendly to mergers in some cases.
In recent years, antitrust enforcement has increasingly focused on innovation issues, as suggested by the release in 1995 of federal guidelines for licensing intellectual property. 84 The recent concern with innovation may seem a slow reaction to Schumpeter's (1942) For the future, two related challenges confront the 1990s approach to antitrust enforcement, capable as it is of generating various results. One is for economists and attorneys to devise analytical techniques that accurately identify complex business practices as being pro-competitive or anticompetitive. The second is to adapt such techniques to formulate rules that are suited to the capabilities of enforcement agencies and courts and give the business community stable, predictable bases for designing business plans. Recent prosecutions such as the abuse of dominance cases against American Airlines and Microsoft place a premium on the ability of the antitrust system to do both of these things.
Conclusions
The Sherman Act and its offshoots, as applied through the twists and turns of doctrine and enforcement in the 20th century, have attained almost constitutional stature in America. 87 No other country has adopted an antitrust statute that contains equally broad substantive provisions and relies so heavily on a common law method of judicial interpretation to implement them. The consciously evolutionary quality of the U.S. antitrust statutes, with their implicit recognition of the need to adjust doctrine over time in light of experience and new learning, gives economists considerable power to influence competition law and policy.
Economists have made two major contributions to the U.S. antitrust regime. The first is to make the case for competition as the superior mechanism for governing the economy. Throughout the 20th century, America's antitrust laws have coexisted uneasily with policies that favor extensive government intervention in the economy through planning, ownership, or sweeping controls over prices and entry. Economists have informed the debate about the relative merits of competition by illuminating the costs of measures that suppress rivalry with the ostensible aim of serving the public interest.
The second significant contribution of economists has been to guide the formation of antitrust policy.
Economic learning has exerted an increasing impact on antitrust enforcement. In the first half of the 20th century, one finds little direct impact of economic research on the major court cases. The influence increases in the century's second half, but usually with a lag. Today, the links between economics and law have been institutionalized with increasing presence of an economic perspective in law schools, extensive and explicit judicial reliance on economic theory, and with the substantial presence of economists in the government antitrust agencies. The availability of new data sources like electronic point-of-purchase data, the refinement of flexible game-theoretic models, and the new emphasis on innovation assures that robust arguments over the proper content of competition policy will flourish into the 21st century.
